Thought and Metaphor: Does Philosophy Teaching Clash or Collaborate with Literary Education?

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Abstract

M. Mahlios, D. Massengill-Show and A. Bary in the article “Making Sense of Teaching through Metaphors: a Review across the Studies” investigated how metaphors influence teachers approach to teaching, curriculum and their work with pupil (Mahlios, Massengill-Show, Barry 2010: 49-71). The aim of this thesis is rather different: to investigate the relation between the thought (concept) and the image described by words (metaphor). The question would be asked: is it possible such a phenomenon as the literary argument, which was formulated by Jacques Derrida in discussion with Habermas. If it is possible, next question; how it is possible? How can the consequences of this clash between metaphor and concept be reflected in the philosophy of education? Can literature as interdisciplinary subject on equal grounds be included into philosophy curriculum? Can philosophy on equal grounds be included into literature curriculum? If not - what is the reason for their separation? If on the contrary on chooses the opposite premise that they can be included - what are the philosophical suppositions for their meeting? This article tries to overview the problem from the historical perspective and to suggest the theoretical approach relying on Jacques Derrida conception. ¹

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Introduction

Philosophy and Literature in the Curriculums of the Universities

One can discern two different approaches in teaching philosophy with regards to literature at the universities in the world. For example, the University of Cambridge suggests the Bachelor course in Philosophy without any attention to English literature. Such a type of teaching philosophy explores human thought, the basis of

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knowledge, the nature of reason, consciousness and cognition, as well as the foundations of value and political theory. Its questions are intriguing and its study requires complex critical thinking, rigorous analysis and consideration of new perspectives. The educators are following the analytic style of philosophy that is now prominent in much of the world developed by Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and others. This analytic tradition is combined it with study of the history of philosophy from Plato to the present day. Literature is not included as a discipline enlarging or enriching critical thinking.

The similar line of teaching philosophy is taken by the two departments: Department of Philosophy and department of the History of Philosophy and Logic in Vilnius University for Bachelor and Master programs.

On the other hand there are attempts to harmonize these two different spheres of culture and to teach philosophy altogether with literature. New College of the Humanities in London suggests the BA studies Philosophy with English. The creators of the program justify their option for this junction by following arguments: “The central aim of the Philosophy major is to bring clarity and rigour to students' thinking and to advance their understanding of, and ability to engage with central questions, arguments, theories and texts concerning the world and our place within it. The central aim of the English minor is to teach you the relevant conceptual tools, skills and knowledge to read the texts we call literature, and other uses of language, with greater accuracy, penetration and pleasure, for the rest of our life” (https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/philosophy-with-english-ba/ ). Alongside with the broad variety of courses in philosophy the students are obliged to study the course of Comparative literature. Philosophy is associated with something rigid, literature— with pleasure. Philosophy’s part dominates.

The English/Philosophy Department at Monroe Community College offers courses in English and Philosophy which will fulfill requirements in Humanities, Social Science, English, Literature, and Natural Science. A course emphasizing college-level, source-based writing (summary, analysis, synthesis, research), with special attention to critical reading and thinking skills. Students will draft, revise, and edit multiple thesis-driven essays. They will also study and practice argument and persuasion. They have three study programs: A. A. Degree in Creative Writing A.A. Degree in English and A.A. Degree in Philosophy (https://www.monroecc.edu/depts/english/). In any case, the degrees are separated.

Bristol University suggests BA English and Philosophy course which gives the opportunity to study two distinct disciplines: philosophy and English literature. The students have an opportunity not only to learn the fundamental principles of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, but also to study literature written in English from the medieval period to the present day. Three year

1 http://www.undergraduate.study.cam.ac.uk/courses/philosophy
course is constructed on equal grounds: suggesting the same amount of courses in philosophy and literature, but literature is suggested as formally first.

The Department of Education and Philosophy at Lithuanian university of educational sciences had chosen the other strategy: giving Philosophy Bachelor degree it nevertheless suggested some interdisciplinary courses in the curriculum of the Bachelor degree program Philosophy and Ethics: such as Philosophy and Literature also Borges seminar. It also included some interdisciplinary courses mixing philosophy and visual arts: Philosophy of Cinema also Ethics and Cinema. But the practice of mixing literature with philosophy is not usual practice for philosophy curriculum designers. As usual Cambridge model prevails. Why it is so difficult to coordinate philosophy with literature in study curriculum? What are the deep historical reasons of this clash?

**Contradictions: Battle Between Logics and Creative Imagination**

Historically one can find the contradiction between philosophy and literature even in Antique. Famous comedian writer Aristofanus is writing comedy *The Clouds* and makes fun of Socrates, showing him swinging in the hanging bag. When old man Strepsiad asks him, what is he doing Socrates answers, that he is walking to and fro in the air and is thinking about the sun. Philosopher Plato in the dialogue *Symposium* overturns the point of view and shows the Aristofanes from a slightly ridiculous perspective. All the participants of the feast one by one discuss the God of love Erot, but when it comes Aristophanes turn, “either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause” (Plato 1942: 174) he had the hiccough and was obliged to change turns with Eryximachus and the physician.

This patronising attitude of the philosopher towards the poet could be traced in the other writing of Plato as well, e.g. *Symposium Apology, Republic*. The philosopher constantly is meditating on wisdom, is longing for her, searching with the same passion as the person being in love seeks for beloved. But seems that the poets as if does not have any contact with wisdom. In *Apology* Socrates visited poets after the visit to politicians searching for the men more wise than himself and from this visit draw the conclusion, “that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them” (Plato 1942: 39). Socrates does not consider these talents more valuable or at least equal as his own ability for abstract brooding. He is ironical about the belief of the poets upon the strenght of their poetry to to decide other things in which they are not wise. Socrates does not think he is following their path and he left them conceiving himself to be superior to the poets for the same reason as he decided he was superior to politicians. He invented his famous formula to justify his superiority: “for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know” (Plato 1942: 38).
In the later texts written by Plato *Republic* this division between a philosopher and a poets becomes even deeper. The philosopher in the project of an ideal state takes total supervision over the poet. He requires him as well as from the other creative artist to express the image of the good in his work, avoiding the exhibition of opposite forms vice, intemperance, meanness and indecency. If the case poet is not going to obey the instruction he would be excluded from the state altogether. Why philosopher thinks he has a right to suggest such a project? Because only does he knows what is beauty in itself. All the artists, including poets “having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty”. Only philosopher is able “to recognize the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea” (Plato 1942: 364). Poet is a man of opinion, philosopher – of a knowledge. He loves wisdom and is able to contemplate absolute idea of unchangeable beauty, poet loves just the beautiful signs (See: Baranova 2015).

Aristotle in his *Poetics* turned his attention to the phenomenon of metaphor. He made a distinction between ordinary descriptive language as literal language and metaphorical figurative language and left the epistemic primacy only to the literal language, where metaphor according to Aristotle can only operate as a secondary device, one which is dependent on the prior level of ordinary descriptive language. Philosophical language is the first-order language and in itself contains nothing metaphorical. “In purely conventional terms, poetic language can only be said to refer to itself; that is, it can accomplish imaginative description through metaphorical attribution, but the description does not refer to any reality outside of itself. For the purposes of traditional rhetoric and poetics in the Aristotelian mode, metaphor may serve many purposes; it can be clever, creative, or eloquent, but never true in terms of referring to new propositional content. This is due to the restriction of comparison to substitution, such that the cognitive impact of the metaphoric transfer of meaning is produced by assuming similarities between literal and figurative domains of objects and the descriptive predicates attributed to them” (Theodorou).

The rebellion against the philosopher as a more wiser supervisor of a poet takes part in philosophy itself. Nietzsche bravely disagrees with Plato starting from his first book *The Birth of Tragedy*. Contrary to the postulate stated by Socrates and Plato that logic has obvious priority over creativity he suggest opposite statement: “<...>only as an aesthetic phenomena are existence and the world eternally be justified <...>” (Nietzsche 203: 76 ). Nietzsche tries to return the immanent value of this creative spontaneity and the right for the poet to create leaning only on the Dionysian spontaneity and the apollonian feeling of form. He unmask Socrates who condemns the art and ethics for the reason his critical gaze saw everywhere only the lack of insight and spreading delusion. As a matter of fact Nietzsche by stressing the contempt an superiority Socrates felt to the poets, reveals the aggressiveness and self-loving pomposity of the intellect and the logic, its limited ability to grasp creativity. According to Nietzsche, Socrates understood unly single form of poetic creativity – the fables of Aesop. But for Socrates tragic art does not seek “to speak the truth” at all.
Apart to the fact that it address itself to those “without much sense”, and thus not to philosophers. Nietzsche considers Socrates totally uncapable to understand tragedy, which is Greek art *par excellence*. He saw in it only some signs of irrationality, for this reason classified tragedy as toady’s art showing what is pleasant but not what is useful. He demanded from his disciples stay away such unphilosophical temptation with much success that the young poet of tragedy Plato, immediately burned his poetical writings in order to be able to become Socrates’s student” (Nietzsche 2003: 164). Nietzsche considered, that even following logic every decent and gifted man one day inevitably meets what is unexplainable.

Nietzsche also challenged the Aristotelian understanding of the role of metaphor together with Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence. He saw in metaphor the straight way towards the truth. Nietzsche boldly suggests that we are, from the outset, *already in metaphor*. The concepts and judgments we use to describe reality do not flatly reflect pre-existing similarities or causal relationships between themselves and our physical intuitions about reality, they are themselves metaphorical constructions; that is, they are creative forms of differentiation emerging out of a deeper undifferentiated primordiality of being. The truth of the world is more closely reflected in the Dionysian level of pure aesthetic immersion into an “undecipherable” innermost essence of things (see: Theodorou).

On the other side, literary men are themselves quite strong. They are able to challenge philosophers.

“I always found it untasteful to treat equally the poet and the thinker, – wrote Emil Michael Cioran. – There are some spheres philosophers should avoid. To dismantle a poem as if any system, is a crime, even blasphemy. It is strange, that poets are happy, when they do not understand what is said about them. The jargon pleases them and creates the illusion of laudation. This weakness reduces them till the level of their commentators” (Cioran 2005: 128).

Witold Gombrowicz the polish origin writer from Argentina sagaciously noticed, that literary men should protect the art from compulsion of philosophical speculations: “The artist who allows himself to be seduced into these spheres of brain speculations is lost. We, the men of art, recently too much trustfully allowed to make ourselves fooled by philosophers and other scientists”. “The art – is fact, but not a commentary, attached with a pin to a fact. It is not our business to explain, teach, systematize, prove. We are the word which testifies: here I have a pain, - this attracts me - I love this – I hate this- I desire this - I do not want this...Science would remain abstract, but our word – it is a voice of a man from body and blood, this is an individual voice. For us it is important not idea, but personality. We realize ourselves not due to the concepts, but due to individuals. We are and must remain individuals, our task is to maintain the alive human voice in the world becoming more and more abstract”, - as a program formulates the writer. In difference from philosopher, moralist, thinker or theologist, says Gombrowicz the artist is permanently changing. The artist cannot see the world
from one point of view, - he experiences the permanent shift inside himself and only his own movement he can oppose to the movement of the world. The easiness of the artist Gombrowicz in inclined to call his depth and to oppose this his trait to philosopher (Gombrowicz 1999: 82). Gombrowicz tells the story about his meeting with the German writer Günter Grass. Knowing in advance that he does not like philosophy very much Gombrowicz deliberately started to discuss philosophical matters. “Then with a subtle bow politely discreet Grass pronounced: “Deeply sorry, but my sister, she is standing near by every time she hears more than six names of philosophers experience nervous cough”(Gombrowicz 1999: 196). One can understand Grass very clearly. The writer can write without integration into his consciousness any traces of philosophical speculation.

But if one attentively exams the indexes of Gombrowicz diaries in three volumes, one can find more than six name of philosophers. Gombrowicz discusses texts of philosophers he recently read: He mentions Nikolaj Berdiajev, Henri Bergson, Martin Buber, Soren Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Spinoza, notices even philosophers of history - Wilhelm Dilthey, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. He cites Roland Barth, reads Michel Foucault book The Things and Words, is attracted by the idea of episteme, plays with it. He mentions quite frequently Wilhelm Hegel, in the first volume mostly frequently remembers Friedrich Nietzsche, in the third – concentrates on Jean-Paul Sartre. It is obvious, that Gombrowicz likes Sartre, but strangely enough, that not literary Sartre, Sartre as a writer of novels, but ‘philosophical Sartre, the author of “Being and Nothingness”. When he is coming to Paris meeting everyone Gombrowicz asks if they had read the phenomenological treatise by Sartre Being and Nothingness (L’Etre et la Néant). Gombrowicz is wondering that nobody reads this Sartrean book and speak on it only superficial banalities, saying that his novel are only illustration to his philosophy, and the philosophy – only illustration to his belles-lettres. Frenchmen more that philosophizing Sartre like the writer Proust. Gombrowicz chooses quite contrary. “Sartre, not Proust! The helplessness of Proust gets in no comparison to the creative tension of Sartre! How could they do not notice that!”, - becomes angry Gombrowicz. He confesses that half of book of the Being and Nothingness is not acceptable for him as well, does not fit his life experience and he simply skipped these pages. But for creative power of Sartre interfere his philosophical writings. He sees them as integral part of the Sartrean works. Maybe for this reason Gombrowicz as a writer is able speculate upon the problem of relation between philosophy and literature seeing not only their controversies, but also immanent parallels. Gombrowicz discerns two possible strivings in man: striving for form, for definite shape and striving to negate this shape. Humanity, according to writer, must constantly define itself and constantly to negate this definition Philosophy is the result of the first striving, literature – of the second Every thought, with a help of which the discrepancy between form and reality is been tried to define becomes form itself and confirm once more that we are longing for form. But, on the other side, every philosophical thought exists only in the background of infinity. This infinity–still–not-
yet-form, is neither light, nor dark, but the mixture of everything, ferment, disorder, contingency. This sphere of not-yet-form and not-yet-importance is unpredictable and unexpected. Gombrowicz considers, that arguments of philosophers are nor able to explain it (Gombrowicz 1999: 169). This is a sphere of a writer. So philosophy and literature can coexist not pretending to take the place of the other or enlarge at the expense of the other. The striving for form is as much important as the ability manoeuvre in indetermination.

Philosophy as a Branch of Literature

On the other hand, it is possible to treat philosophy as a branch of a literature. The example of such rapprochement, even identity uniting them both under one title as 'literature' is the French literary journal *Magazine littéraire*. Every issue of the journal as usual is devoted to one personality. The scope of authors is rather broad. Some of them are really “in between” philosophy and literature” as already mentioned Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, literary critique Maurice Blanchot, post-philosopher Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze or existentialists Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre. But under the title of literature here appears issues dedicated to seems at the first sight so far from literature standing philosophers as Spinoza, Descartes, Bergson, Wittgenstein, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Marx and Michel Foucault. It seems that in French culture literature and philosophy are rather close. Derrida notices that their meeting becomes possible for some peculiarities of educational system. Literary critique in France has long trust in philosophy. The best example is Maurice Blanchot – literary critique, who made much influence to the postmodern philosopher (he communicated with Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida. He was also lifelong friend of Emmanuel Levinas). To understand the nature of literature he used insights of such a heavy thinker as Georg Hegel.

The author of this article does not identify philosophy with literature. The conjunction “and” indicates their difference, leading to a contradiction, parallels and only after that – to intersections. The dialogue between the philosophy and literature becomes possible when uniqueness of every of them is comprehended. Kant transformed platonic conception what philosopher is. According to Plato, philosopher sees truth. According to Kant, philosopher reasons about the conditions of possibility, how is possible cognition, obligation or hope. When one reasons about the conditions of possibility one can skip peculiarities as contingences for the reason all attention is devoted to the thought experiment and logical consequence. Literature, on the contrary, shows its strength when is based on the deep understanding of the contingencies of experience giving new life for them with a help of creative imagination. Nobody requires from the literature direct exposition of the idea. Socialistic realism is historically dead. But to write, the same as to read mean to see, says Lithuanian writer Giedra Radvilavičiutė. “Literary text first of all is visual. The literary text without created inside visual image is flat and dull. We see first of all black words in the white background, but as in Japanese drawing when reading the light
appears, the shadows, the movement, the space, the texture and emotion.” But nevertheless philosophy and literature somehow meet. They are two eminent philosophical academic journal with the conjuncture ‘and’ – “Philosophy and literature”. One of them is issued in Great Britain, the other one – in United States of America. Philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum worked much on this topic. In her book Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature she notices, that to the exploration of some important questions about human beings and human life form and style are not incidental features. “A view of life is told. The telling itself – the selection of genre, formal structures, vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader’s sense of life – all of this expresses the sense of life and of value, a sense of what matters and what does not, of what learning and communications are, of life’s relations and connections. Life is never simply presented by a text, it is always represented as something. This “as’ can, and must, be seen not only in the paraphrasable content, but also in the style. Which itself expresses choices and selections, and sets up, in the reader, certain activities and transactions rather than others”(Nussbaum 1992: 5). So the writer also tells his conception of life. The author agrees with Henry James and Marcel Proust’s idea, that in choosing his style or the other possibilities of expression the writer becomes a bit of a medium or a prophet.

But to approach the connection between philosophy and literature is possible from the other perspective as well. Everett W.Knight in the book Literature Considered as Philosophy. The French Example treats the meeting of philosophy and literature from a phenomenological perspective: starts from Husserls’ ideas and ends by Sartre, uniting phenomenology and literature. Between Husserl and Sartre different writers, such as Baudelaire, Gide, Malraux, Saint-Exupery are phenomenologically discussed. Richard Kuhns in the book Structure of Experience. Essays on the Affinity between Philosophy and Literature states, that philosophy and literature influence each other, but in a such a subtle way that it is difficult to express it in words. But both of them meet the same problems and at some historical stages very similarly structure the experience. Such a history when the philosophy and literature meet, usually is named the history of ideas. The author discusses the problem of truth as a value of tragedy, the art as a phenomenon of imagination and the defender of moral values, the connection between modernity and death, the philosophy as a form of art.

**Philosophy and Literature: Logic or Rhetoric?**

Jürgen Habermas in the book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity writes: “Derrida is particularly interested in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric, canonized since Aristotle, on its head” (Habermas 1987: 187). Habermasas – on the
side on Aristotle. The thing Derrida stranded on its head, he tries to put on its feet again. He discusses the project of Derrida in the only purpose - to show that his strategies on levelling the genre distinction between philosophy and literature do not work.

Habermas starts from very far away – from Nietzsche’s radical self-critique of reason and its engaging in a performative contradiction when the tools of thought seem to be the only available means for uncovering their own insufficiency. Derrida, according to Habermas, wants to expand the sovereignty of rhetoric over the realm of logical in order to solve the problem confronting the totalizing critique of reason. In doing so Derrida, says Habermas, undercuts the very problem, makes it objectless. There can only be talk about ‘contradiction’ in the light of consistency requirements when logic maintains its primacy over rhetoric. But when it loses this primacy and is subordinated to aesthetic demands, the contradiction is over. Then the deconstructionist can deal with the works of philosophy as works of literature and adapt the critique of metaphysics to the standards of a literary criticism that does not understand itself in a scientific way. “The distinction between philosophy and literature as different genres are submerged in one comprehensive, all-embracing content of texts. “Derrida talks in a hypostatizing manner about a “universal text” (Habermas 1987: 190), notices Habermas. Habermas is not going to agree with this levelling of two genres. “What remains is self-inscribing writing as the medium in which each text is woven together with everything else. Even before it makes its appearance, every text and every particular genre has already lost its autonomy to an all-devouring context and an uncontrollable happening of spontaneous text production”(Habermas 1987: 190). Habermas nevertheless tries to maintain these criteria of logical consistency. He supposes philosophy, science, art, should maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis the universal text. He cares not only about the status of philosophy, but the literary critique as well. Habermas is conscious about the fact, that when the genres of philosophy and literature are levelled, literary criticism is not primary a scientific (or scholarly wissenschaftliches) enterprise but observes the same rhetorical criteria as its literary objects. Literary critic becomes a creator as well. Criticism does not need to consider itself as something secondary; it gains literary status. Habermans has in mind Hillis Miller, Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, critics who no more consider themselves as parasites of the text they interpret, for the reason that all of the writers (creators and critiques) with pre-existing language inhabit a host-text (Habermas 1987: 192). What the matter about it? Why Habermas does not congratulate the fact, the critiques of metaphysics emerging in philosophy itself so largely increased the possibilities of literary critique? Habermas is inclined to leave everything as it was.

But maybe for this are there rather weighty arguments? Why Habermas starts this battle? He is inclined to maintain the rights of everyday language which fulfil the communicative functions of everyday life. This language has a power to solve the problems of everyday life and due to it the community members have a possibility to
master the problems posed by the world: e.g. the acquisition of knowledge, the transmission of culture, the formation of personal identity, socialization and social integration. The unleveling of two genres - literature and philosophy - and aestheticizing the language ignores this function of language and reduces to one – poetic-world-disclose-function of language. Poetic function of language discloses the world or creates new worlds, acknowledges Habermas. But it ignores the power of language to solve the problems of every communicative practise. “The polar tension, - says Habermas – between world-disclosure and problem-solving is held together within the functional matrix of ordinary language; but art and literature on the one side, and science, morality and law on the other, are specialized for experiences and modes of knowledge that can be shaped and worked out within the compass of one linguistic function and one dimension of validity and a time. Derrida holistically levels these complicated relationships in order to equate philosophy with literature and criticism. He fails to recognize the special status that both philosophy and literary criticism, each in its own way, assume as mediators between expert cultures and everyday world” (Habermas 1987: 207). Habermas acknowledges that literary criticism and philosophy have a family resemblance to literature – and to that extent to one another as well – in their rhetorical achievements. But their family relationship stops right here, for in each of these enterprises the tools rhetoric are subordinated to the discipline of a distinct form of argumentation (Habermas 1987: 209-2010).

Habermas considers that Derrida does not belong to those philosophers who like to argue, so he argues with his disciples in literary criticism within the Anglo-Saxon climate of argument, namely Jonathan Culler. To Culler’s exposed arguments Habermas opposes the arguments of Austin and Searle. When Habermas polemizes with “Anglo-Saxon” Culler does he really argument against “French” Derrida? Is “Anglo-Saxon Derrida” indeed a “real Derrida” or maybe only his already interpreted textual version? When arguing against “not real Derrida” is not Habermas himself engaged into the textual game of creating new worlds by textuality he is opposing in this discussion? But what Habermas has to do when Derrida, as he says, does not like to argue?

**CAN SIGULARITY OF EXPERIENCE BE CONSIDERED AS AN ARGUMENT?**

Maurizio Ferraris gave the possibility for Derrida to answer Habermasian challenge “Derrida does not like to argue”. At the interview when talking with Derrida Ferraris asked him what does he think about the challenging statement of Habermas saying: “Derrida is particularly interested in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric, canonized since Aristotle, on its head” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002 : 53), expressed in speech in 1984 during the opening adress at the Joyce conference in Frankfurt and published later in “The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity”. Derrida when answering showed his disagreement with Habermas’ critique. According to his view deconstruction does not opose the project of Enlightenment, as Habermas considers it, but, on the contrary, deconstruction is a project in favour of the Enlightenment (les
Derrida suggests not to confuse the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment of tomorrow. The right thing would have been not to accept debate for or against Enlightenment but to differentiate each time which Enlightenment is discussed. But what particular Enlightenment he has in mind this time Derrida does not mention as well. But it is obvious that Derrida does not want to be excluded from the Enlightenment. That does not matter which from. There are concepts he does not want to renounce or to deconstruct. The same thing he does not want to be excluded from the philosophy or from the truth. "Truth is not a value one can renounce. The deconstruction of philosophy does not renounce truth – any more, for that matter, than literature does. It is a question of thinking this other relation to truth", says he in the book “A Taste for the Secret” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 10).

Derrida notices, that, for example, Richard Rorty, is perfectly happy to give philosophy over to literature – on the understanding that it is a private matter, a private language. Derrida, on the contrary, is eager to emphasize, that deconstruction has nothing whatsoever to do with privatizing philosophy, letting it take shelter in literature. “(Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 10). He disagrees with the issue of Habermas that he himself reduced philosophy to a literature. Also Derrida is trying to avoid the label of being the creator of “post-philosophy”. He considers the concept of “post-philosophy” even dangerous for it leaves the philosophy behind. He is a philosopher and once more a philosopher, does not end stating Derrida. He repeats it so arduously as if Habermas would had have touched his long lasting trauma of “not-to-belonging”, as if he would have had something in common with this principal of gymnasium (surveillant general) who long ago in 1942 excluded him from the school sending him home to the parents who had him to explain why he being Jew is not permitter to attend any more the school, to belong to it. Derrida constantly spoke about this traumatic experience from his childhood as an immanent fact of his intellectual and creative biography. Sense of not-belonging distanced from belonging to the Jewish community as well. He hated Jewish school, saying to himself “no, I am part neither of this nor of that” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 38-39). And after that he become a philosopher. In Algeria he already read not only Camus, but also Nietzsche, in Paris studied Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty. Always was attracted by Kierkegaard. The wheel of the history makes a round and he hears again as if Habermas saying to him: “Derrida, You are reducing philosophy to a literature, so please, go home, go back to the literature, for the reason you do not belong to the real philosophers, go to “post-philosophers”. Is being a literary man from the point of view of philosopher the same status as being Jew in the Algeria occupied by Nazis? Nobody is destroyed but on the other hand do not feel any real belonging. Derrida does not allow to be kicked out so easily for the second time. But in doing so he must to answer somehow or to contradict to the arguments presented by Habermas. Derrida tries to remain a philosopher but at the same time not to betray the literature as well. So he opposes Habermasian arguments saying, that reduction of philosophy to a literature is not possible altogether for the reason they are not separated at all. Literature is as good as philosophy is: it has its own arguments. Derrida suggests to
broaden the concept of argumentation. When philosophers speak of argument, notices Derrida, they very often have a certain model of argument in mind and when they fail to recognize the familiar model, they hasten to conclude that there is no argument. Derrida thinks, that there is argument, but in another form. “I think that literature is argumentative, in another way, with different procedures. Literature attempts to lead to conclusion, even if they are suspensive or undecidable; it is an organized discourse that exchanges with the other, needs the response of the other, is discursive, and therefore passes through a temporality”, concludes Derrida. (Derrida, Ferraris 2002 : 38-39). The fact that literary arguments do not coincide philosophical is not making them not arguments at all – such is Derrida’s main idea.

But he does not explain how this literary argument looks like. He is not giving any example. For this reason the following question arises: in what form and how literary argument is possible in itself? It is possible to ask the way Derrida likes to ask: who is the author of it? The author? The reader? Literary critic? Is a writer writing for the sake of presenting arguments and the reader reads for the sake of recognizing them? Even if not in a very definite form. But if really there is such a thing as literary argument in itself? Is literature really alive for the reason of its argumentation ability? It seems thus Kantian criterion of disinterestedness play of understanding, intellect and imagination as the basis of aesthetic judgement in this case are left behind? What is the need for approaching literature towards philosophy? Does it gives more intrinsic value to the literature? And philosopher who is applying the method of deconstruction for reading literary texts, - is he searching in it for particular arguments? What these arguments look like? Arguments have to persuade. Whom they are persuading? For what? Derrida does not ask such kind of the questions and does not search for the answers. And when reading the literary texts it seems he himself is looking not for the arguments. He is paying attention to the margins, to the details, to the style, betraying the intentions of writer. The concepts of the literary argument in vocabulary of the creator of deconstruction becomes the most mysterious of all his insights. Nevertheless, Derrida intends to defend the right of the literature for the argument saying philosophers themselves are using rather various forms of argumentation. Kant, for example, criticized Descartes saying he is not faithful to what argumentation ought to be. Aristotle indicated to Plato, that in some places he is no longer arguing. If within philosophy itself there is no consensus on the subject of argumentation, according to Derrida, one has to accept the fact that outside philosophy the same dissent exists. Lets suppose that Derrida already persuaded. Philosopher already feels a bit ashamed and does not require from literary men the same structure of the arguments they are accustomed to use. But does it means that for this reason the trauma of not belonging become less heavy? This trauma would had have disappeared at all if Derrida were identified itself with a literary men. In this case he would have a right to pronounce: the reproaches of Habermas do not reach me anymore. I am literary man, so I am arguing in another form. But Derrida says quite opposite things. He insists he is a philosopher and only philosopher. He only have
defended the right of literary men to be treated very close or the same as philosophers are. But leaves himself totally unprotected. The open question remains: how should the philosopher, who invented deconstruction as a strategy for reading and interpreting texts, not allowing himself to be named as post-philosopher argues himself? If remaining the classical philosopher, is he allowed to argument the same indefinite manner as literary men usually do? Or maybe if he wants to maintain the label for himself as philosopher, he must follow for the other definite rules of different language game?

According to our view, Derrida confronted this unsolved contradiction for the reason he allowed himself to be engaged to the discussion started by Habermas about the argumentation in philosophy and in literature. The nature of arguments never interested Derrida. It is difficult to explain the premises of one’s philosophy using the concepts and premises of the opponent. The relation between literature and philosophy is clearer when Derrida approaches it from the perspective important to him.

This perspective, as testifies Derrida, was opened him by Soren Kierkegaard, to whom he had been most faithful and who interested him most. Derrida was impressed by the meaning Kierkegaard gave to the word subjectivity, the resistance of existence to the concept or the system Derrida even acknowledges that what some people thought they could interpret as a reduction of philosophy to a literature, as a way of reduction the philosophical to the literary, stems from that gesture he learned from Kierkegaard. In the text “A letter to a Japanese friend” Derrida, when discussing deconstruction refuses to describe it using the word “is” for the reason that the very word “is” returns back to logocentrism. Derrida was more inclined to speak what deconstruction “is not”. But in the interview book “A Taste for the Secret” he is not so categorical. He described the phenomenon he created saying: “Deconstruction is not a method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists, rather, in remarking, in the reading and interpreting the texts, that what has made it possible for philosophers to effect a system is nothing other than a certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a certain incapacity to close a system” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 4). Deconstruction is always a singular and mainly literature was always the representation of the singularity of experience and singularity of existence. “In literature what always interests me is essentially autobiographical – not what is called the ‘autobiographical genre’, but rather the autobiographicity that greatly overflows the ‘genre’ of autobiography”. In autobiographicity Derrida was searching what exceeded the literary genre, the discursive genre and even autos (the self/same). “I try to interrogate that which in the autos disturbs self-relation, but always in an existential experience that is singular’ and if not ineffable at least untranslatable or on the verge of untranslatability”(Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 41). But academic philosophy for Derrida has always been at the service of this autobiographical design of memory. The great question for Derrida was always the question who. Who? Who asks the question que? Where? How? When? Who arrives? Memoirs – the wild desire to preserve everything
– interested Derrida both in literature and philosophy. So literary text and philosophical text are approaching each other because of this singularity of writing. On the other hand they both have something to do with the untranslatability of existence, so they both have something to do with the secret.

**How to Overcome the Gap Between the Linguistic-Metaphorical and the Philosophical Realms?**

Ferraris in their conversation with Derrida suggest a possible criterion how to demark the difference between philosophy and literature in two different resources to language. They both speak different language regimes which are very visible in translation. The sense of philosophy may at least partially survive even the most tortuous of transmission, which is not the case with literature, where a very great deal is lost in translation (Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 10-11). Very similarly, through the relation with language the connection between philosophy and poetry describes Lithuanian poet and literary critic Aidas Marcenas in one of his interviews: “For the philosopher the language is a tool, but not a philosopher – a tool for the language. In the case of a poet everything is opposite. For this reason a poet is more primordial, ‘closer to gods’. Maybe it is so: poet is more closer to the heroes of Iliada, many things instead of them are deciding gods. Or just consult. Or when the sentence is well started they finish even better. But philosopher seems is more like a wanderer from Odyssey who all the obstacles must overcome himself, using his own efforts of reason and insanity” (Marcenas 2005: 103-104). Maybe what in literary writers texts is coming ‘from gods’, according to Marcenas words, remains untranslatable. Derrida maybe would have had accepted this point of view. He disagrees with the other thesis expressed by Ferraris: he dislikes the idea, that in contrast to the literary text in the text of philosopher everything is translatable. Derrida says, that does not want neither to mix philosophy and literature, nor reduce the one to the other. On the other hand Derrida sees in what is called ‘philosophical’ an adherence to natural language, a profound indissociability of certain philosophies from the Greek, the German, the Latin, which is not the literary part of philosophy, but is instead something that philosophy shares with literature. And conversely, there is something translatable in literature, as Derrida names it – a promise of translation. But both philosophy and literature are bound up with natural language. Descartes and Leibniz tried to formulize the philosophical language, but their efforts failed. So as if accepting differences between literature and philosophy Derrida suggests to look for the different criterion of their difference. He tries to avoid the usual division between philosophy and literature and see more complicated divisions. He says, that “if we look more closely, we shall find a Platonic literature that is not literature of Hegel, and a Shakespearean philosophy that is not the philosophy of Dante, Goethe or Diderot” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002: 12). So Derrida open the huge project of new possible interdisciplinary investigations.
What allows for Derrida so to change this point of departure? For him every text – philosophical or literary – has its own context and its signature. The contexts are changing, but in this change something stable nevertheless is left. “So by *ouvre I mean something that remains, that is absolutely not translatable, that bears a signature*” (Derrida, Ferraris 2002:14)

As noticed Theodorou, “Derrida, from the outset, will call into question the assumption that the formation of concepts (logos) somehow escapes the primordiality of language and the fundamentally metaphorical-mythical nature of philosophical discourse. In a move which goes much further than Ricoeur, Derrida argues for what Guiseseppe Stellardi so aptly calls the “reverse metaphorization of concepts.” The reversal is such that there can be no final separation between the linguistic-metaphorical and the philosophical realms. These domains are co-constitutive of one another, in the sense that either one cannot be fully theorized or made to fully or transparently explain the meaning of the other. The result is that language acquires a certain obscurity, ascendance, and autonomy. It will permanently elude our attempts to fix its meaning-making activity in foundational terms which necessitate a transcendent or externalized (to language) unified being” (Theodorou).

**References**


